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August 22 2013

05:47

Five Golden Rules For A Successful Bug Bounty Program

Bug bounty programs have become a popular complement to already existing security practices, like secure software development and security testing. In this space, there are successful examples with many bugs reported and copious rewards paid out. For vendors, users and researchers, this seems to be a mutually beneficial ecosystem.

True is that not all bug bounty initiatives have been so successful. In some cases, a great idea was poorly executed resulting in frustration and headache for both vendors and researchers.  Ineffective programs are mainly caused by security immaturity, as not all companies are ready and motivated enough to organize and maintain such initiatives.  Bug bounties are a great complement to other practices but cannot completely substitute professional penetration tests and source code analysis. Many organizations fail to understand that and jump on the bounties bandwagon without having mature security practices in place.

Talking with a bunch of friends during BlackHat/Defcon, we came up with a list of five golden rules to set your bug bounty program up for success. Although the list is not exhaustive, it was built by collecting opinions from numerous peers and should be a good representation of what security researchers expect.

If you are a vendor considering to start a similar initiative, please read it carefully.

The Five Golden Rules:

1. Build trust, with facts
Security testing is based on trust, between client and provider. Trust is important during testing, and especially crucial during disclosure time. As a vendor, make sure to provide as much clarity as you can. For duplicate bugs, increase your transparency by providing more details to the reporter (e.g. date/time of the initial disclosure, original bug ID, etc.). Also, fixing bugs and claiming that they are not relevant (thus non-eligible to rewards) is a perfect way to lose trust.

2. Fast turn around
Security researchers are happy to spend extra time on explaining bugs and providing workarounds, however they also expect to get notified (and rewarded) at the same reasonable speed. From reporting the bug to paying out rewards, you should have a fast turn around. Fast means days - not months. Even if you need more time to fix the bug, pay out immediately the reward and explain in detail the complexity of rolling out the patch. Decoupling internal development life cycles and bounties allows you to be flexible with external reporters while maintaining your standard company processes.

3. Get security experts
If you expect web security bugs, make sure to have web security experts around you. For memory corruption vulnerabilities, you need people able to understand root causes and to investigate application crashes. Either internally or through leveraging trusted parties, this aspect is crucial for your reputation. Many of us have experienced situations in which we had to explain basic vulnerabilities and how to replicate those issues. In several cases, the interlocutors were software engineers and not security folks: we simply talk different languages and use different tools.

4. Adequate rewards
Make sure that your monetary rewards are aligned with the market. What's adequate? Check Mozilla, Facebook, Google, Etsy and many others. If you don't have enough budget - just setup a wall of fame, send nice swags and be creative. For instance, you could decide to pay for specific classes of bugs or medium-high impact vulnerabilities only. Always paying at the low end of your rewards range, even for critical security bugs, it is just pathetic. Before starting, crunch some numbers by reviewing past penetration test reports performed by recognized consulting boutiques.

5. Non-eligible bugs
Clarify the scope of the program by providing concrete examples, eligible domains and types of bugs that are commonly rejected. Even so, you will have to reject submissions for a multitude of reasons: be as clear and transparent as possible. Spend a few minutes to explain the reason of rejection, especially when the researcher has over-estimated severity or not properly evaluated the issue.

Happy Bug Hunting, Happy Bug Squashing!

October 21 2011

06:24

"No More Free Bugs" Initiatives

Two years after the launch of the "No More Free Bugs" philosophy, several companies and Open Source projects are now offering programs designed to encourage security research in their products. In addition, many private firms are publicly offering vulnerability acquisition programs.


This post is an attempt to catalog all public and active incentives. This includes traditional "Bug Bounty Programs" as well as "Vulnerability/Exploit Acquisition Programs".

Bug Bounty Programs


Sponsor
Target
Reward Barracuda Vulnerabilities in Barracuda appliances, including Spam/Virus Firewall, Web Filter, WAF, NG Firewall $500-$3,133.7 CCBill.com CCBill web application vulnerabilities $200-$500 Djbdns Verifiable security holes in the latest version of Djbdns $1000 Facebook Facebook web platform security bugs. No third-party applications Starting from $500 Google Chromium browser project and selected Google web properties bugs $500-$3,133.7 Hex-Rays Security bugs in the latest public release of Hex-Rays IDA Up to $3000 Mozilla Firefox, Thunderbird and selected Mozilla Internet-facing websites bugs $500-$3000, plus Mozilla T-shirt Piwik Flaws in Piwik web analytics software $200-$500 Qmail Verifiable security holes in the latest version of Qmail $5000 Tarsnap Tarsnap bugs, affecting either pre-release or released versions $1-$2000
Vulnerability/Exploit Acquisition Programs


Sponsor

Target

Reward
BeyondSecurity SecuriTeam High and medium impact bugs in widely spread software $n/a Coseinc Unpublished security vulnerabilities for Windows, Linux and Solaris $n/a Digital Armaments Vulnerability and/or exploit code for high value software $n/a ExploitHub Legitimate market-place for non-zero-day Metasploit exploits $50~$1000 iSight Partners Bugs in typical corporate environment applications $n/a Netragard 0-day exploits against well-known software $n/a TippingPoint ZDI Undisclosed vulnerability research, affecting widely deployed software $n/a plus awards and benefits, depending on the contributor's status VeriSign iDefence Security vulnerabilities in widely deployed applications $n/a White Fir Design Bugs in WordPress code and plugins (with over 1 million downloads and compatible with the most recent WordPress) $50-$500
Contributions are welcome! If you are aware of an initiative not listed here, please leave a comment and we will update this page over time.

Just to clarify, we aim at indexing programs that are:
  • Legal. Although black/gray market places exist, we don't certainly want to list them here
  • Active. We want to keep track of ongoing initiatives. Even time-limited programs are eligible, as long as they are still accepting submissions
  • Public. All entries must have publicly available details. This may range from accurate guidelines and rules to just a simple sentence stating the nature of the incentive
  • Reward-based. In most cases, entries are "cash-for-bugs" programs. However, any kind of tangible reward is eligible. "No More Free Bugs" versus "No More Cheap Bugs" disputes are not considered here

December 30 2010

18:19

TYPO3-SA-2010-020, TYPO3-SA-2010-022 explained

On 16th December, TYP03 released a new security update (TYPO3-SA-2010-022) for their content management system. Apparently, this web-based framework is widely used in many important websites.
Within this update, TYPO3 team fixed a vulnerability that I've discovered a few weeks ago. In detail, this discovery pertains to a previous vulnerability fixed in TYPO3-SA-2010-020 and discovered by Gregor Kopf.

TYP03 decided to follow a policy of least disclosure. Although it's an Open Source project, no technical details are available in the wild besides these (1,2). As I strongly believe that this practice does not improve the overall security (as mentioned in a previous post), I've decided to briefly explain this interesting flaw.

From the advisory, we can actually deduce two important concepts:
A Remote File Disclosure vulnerability in the jumpUrl mechanism [..] Because of a non-typesafe comparison between the submitted and the calculated hash, it is possible [..]
In a nutshell, the JumpUrl mechanism allows to track access on web pages and provided files (e.g. /index.php?id=2&type=0&jumpurl=/etc/passwd&juSecure=1&locationData=2%3a&juHash=2b1928bfab)

The patch (see this shell script) simply replaces the two equal signs with three (loose vs strict comparisons).

That's the affected code:


Having this knowledge, it is probably clear to the reader that the overall goal is to bypass the comparison between $juHash and $calcJuHash. While the former is user supplied (string or array), the latter is derived from a substr(md5_value,10) (string).

In PHP, comparisons involving numerical strings result in unexpected behaviors (at least for me before studying this chapter).
If you compare a number with a string or the comparison involves numerical strings, then each string is converted to a number and the comparison performed numerically
If the string does not contain any of the characters '.', 'e', or 'E' and the numeric value fits into integer type limits (as defined by PHP_INT_MAX), the string will be evaluated as an integer. In all other cases it will be evaluated as a float.
For instance, the following comparisons are always TRUE:
if(0=="php")-> TRUE
if(12=="12php")-> TRUE
if(110=="110")-> TRUE
if(100=="10E1")-> TRUE
if(array()==NULL) -> TRUE
[..]
And again, also the following comparisons are TRUE:
If("0"=="0E19280311"){}
If("0"=="0E00106552"){}
If("0"=="0E81046233"){}
Consequently, we can pad and wait till the substring of an md5 hash resembles this form. If you do the math, you will discover that the combined probability of having such calculated hash is considerably less than pure bruteforcing.
~37037037 max trials (worth case) VS 3656158440062976 all possibilities
In practice, the number of iterations is even less as "0000E13131" and similar strings are also accepted.

To further improve this attack, I've discovered another bypass (TYPO3-SA-2010-022) which allows the disclosure of TYPO3_CONF_VARS['SYS']['encryptionKey']. In this way, it is possible to retrieve the key once and download multiple files without repeating the entire process. Using multiple requests, this attack takes a few minutes (8-20 minutes in a local network). A real coder can surely enhance it.

As you can see from the exploit (posted on The Exploit Database), the fileDenyPattern mechanism bypass is pretty trivial. A demonstration video is also available here (slow connection, sorry).

Keep your TYPO3 installation updated! A patch is already available from the vendor's site.

@_ikki

December 29 2010

12:46

Unspecified vulnerabilities

If you're a pentester, it's probably not news to you that "least disclosure" policies for disclosing vulnerabilities are fruitless. Unfortunately, they are even counterproductive for the entire security ecosystem and I will try to convince you within this post.

Before going any further, let's explain what "least disclosure" actually means.
In a nutshell, least disclosure is about providing the least necessary facts of vulnerabilities that are needed to know if a user might be affected and what the possible impact would be. No technical details, no exploits, no proof-of-concept code.

As mentioned here, you may argue that it increases the overall security as a random "black hat needs to put some efforts in thinking and coding before he's able to exploit a vulnerability".

However, we all claim that "security through obscurity" is bad:
  • Aggressors don't have time constraints. They can analyze patches, read all documentation and spend nights on a single flaw

  • No technical details in the wild generally means no signatures and detectors in security tools

  • "Least Disclosure" tends to degenerate in "Unspecified Vulnerability in Unspecified Components". Please fix your computer and don't ask why
Although we cannot certainly force vendors' disclosure policies, sharing the outcome of any security research may be beneficial at the end of the day.

Thoughtful reader, please note that getting profit from vulnerabilities does not necessary implicate concealing details. For instance, see the Mozilla Security Bounty Program FAQ.
We're rewarding you for finding a bug, not trying to buy your silence
If you enjoy the spirit, you may appreciate the following posts. Welcome back NibbleSec readers!

@_ikki
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